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2Introduction
As the late Jimmy Durante used to say it, 'you ain't seen
nothing yet.' Only what you ain't seen isn't funny. The world
has at least 5,000 nations, that is groups of humans with
distinct languages, cultures and histories. It has less than
200 states. If I may proffer a quote that I used to introduce
an article published in this year's annual World Refugee
Survey, "No enduring world order can be created which ignores
the ubiquitous yearnings of nations in search of roots in an
ethnic past, and no study of nations and nationalism that
completely ignores that past can bear fruit."1
Canadians know what those nationalist yearnings mean
first hand - not only from Quebec and our own aboriginal
peoples, but we supply the peace keepers to the divisions
between the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus and most recently in
Yugoslavia. States all over the world are breaking down into
their national components. I depicted an ominous scenario in
that article I already quoted from World Refugee Survey. "In
Eastern Europe borders are under question as regional
communist empires collapse from the weight of their own
economic mismanagement and suppression of freedom. And this is
only the beginning. The implosion of India, of Indonesia, of
the largest country in Africa, Nigeria, has yet to occur,
though each has had or is experiencing degrees of rebellion
against central state authority. The rebellions of the Sikhs
or of the Ibos are not akin to the secessionist Southern
states in the USA forced to reunite to forge the common
American nation. For India, Indonesia and Nigeria are not
nations forged by states, but each consists of nations which
existed prior to the construction of the state. The question
is whether, when these nationalist forces erupt in these and
other states all over the world in a way that will make the
3present period appear relatively tranquil, will the world
abandon the post-war refugee regime?"
Nationalism is but one of the forces putting pressure on
the disintegration of the nation state. The pressures of
nationalism are towards implosion. There is a second major
pressure - the explosion of state boundaries in the face of
the globalization of the world economy. No state can control
and manage the development of its economy any longer. One
reason has been the globalization of the money supply. Again
we do not have to refer to academic treatises or the latest
week's issue of The Economist. At the end of September,
Canadian interest rates were hiked two points (the highest
single hike since the depression) as the dollar dropped below
eighty cents, threatening a resumption of upward inflationary
pressures at a time when the economy lags, unemployment is
extremely high and we have a large unused productive capacity.
More importantly than this symptom is the fact that what
counts as money is no longer clear and distinct. So it is
difficult to say what there is to control assuming it even can
be controlled. Unprecedented proportions of the debts of
states are held by foreigners. When the monetarists and supply
side theorists gained control of economic policy at the
beginning of the eighties, it was at the very same time that
these very levers of state economic policy began to slip from
state control. Many economists suspect that the creation of
currencies, such as the ECU, to dominate a much larger market
are merely fingers in the dike of the globalization of the
money supply and market at the same time as other levers on
economic policy - interest rates, trade practices, taxation
policy, etc. - remain in state control. In other words, we are
in for a long period of unsettled economic times as the
instruments for making economic policy begin to skew further
and further out of alignment. It is enough to make one believe
4in astrology and the fortune bestowed upon us when the
astrological signs are aligned.
Nationalism implodes the state. The civil society has
exploded state boundaries in far more fundamental ways than
the globalization of trade, the creation of free trade areas,
the development of English as the international lingua franca
of trade, technology and science, the development of mass air
transport and of worldwide communication networks of phones
and televisions. All these human artifacts are above and
beyond the effects of the changes in the natural world such as
large population increases of humans and the despoliation of
the environment.
Accompanying these changes are large movements of peoples
- labour, business, tourists, students. As the ability of the
state to control and direct its economy weakens, as the state
increasingly raises the spectre of fear instead of relying on
the modern device of well conditioned patriotism to hold its
people together, the state can no longer bribe its citizens
with their own money to expand the welfare state. The ability
to allocate surplus value to the state sector has been
declining just as the costs of health care, of pensions, of
social programs have expanded exponentially.
No wonder we do not trust politicians. They have been put
in charge of the state of which we are members, but the
institutions charged with providing us with protection are no
longer congruent with those other societies of which we are
members - the welfare society, the civil society and the
nation. The problem is not that we have no one qualified to
run the store. The problem is that the business which the
store was set up to run has migrated elsewhere. And what do we
do as international and nationalist forces batter our ability
to regulate store hours and tell customers when they can and
5cannot enter, as shareholders seek out the still surviving
stores to attempt to buy shares in what appears to be a
securer bet, and as victims of other collapsing neighbourhoods
flee to our own? We start to bar our windows, put up metal
shutters, install video and alarm systems and put triple dead
locks on the front door.
Where we once advertised for new customers, we now dream
of surviving with the customers we have. Even as we
accommodate more people, we begin to set up the defensive
barriers that are only signs and symptoms that our whole
system of protecting our members, which is the business the
state is in, can no longer be carried out in our present
premises. But instead of recognizing our premises are
obsolete, we revert to age old patterns of reinforcing the
barriers to provide the premises with greater security. And as
more and more strangers come to shop, and as more and more of
them come with lesser education, fewer clothes on their backs
and even less sense of any loyalty to anyone or anything given
the traumas they have come through to get here, we begin to
question our own immediate past dedication to assisting
strangers in need, at the same time as we recruited new
members and served our own customers.
In other words, instead of seeing the world as one made
up of rich versus poor nations, with tides of migrants and
refugees striving to migrate from the East and the South and
overwhelm our prosperity, we would be better to view ourselves
as belonging to a neighbourhood in decline and our efforts at
barring our windows and guarding our doors as symptoms of what
is happening to ourselves rather than as defences against
population pressures from without.
It is not that the Third World is now on our doorstep.
The paradigm is the very reverse. We are on the door steps of
the Third World. Not in terms of impoverishment. There is
6plenty of food in the kitchen and more stocks on the shelf
than ever before. That is why we can so easily deceive
ourselves. We are on the door steps of the Third World in
terms of lack of political self control, or, rather, the sense
of losing political self control. We begin to realize what it
is to live without security where we are no longer in control
of our own destiny. We distrust politicians because we have
entrusted them with controlling our ship of state as the tides
of world forces have treated our captains as if they were in
the stern of canoes running the white water rapids of our
northern rivers. And we distrust strangers, not really for the
threat they bring, but because they tell us what we refuse to
believe - our neighbourhood is in decline. And not because of
them! Somewhere deep down - not very deep down - we know it.
But they get the blame anyway.
There has been a tendency to see those in favour of
control as the antithesis of those who open the hearts and
doors to refugees. When government officials argue that the
only way that they can maintain their current humanitarian
posture is by demonstrating that they are in control and
managing the refugee system, critics tend to view the
expressed humanitarianism as empty rhetoric to disguise the
government's cold-hearted efforts to ratchet down the intake
of refugees and prevent them from arriving on our shores. The
recent facts of history may be inconsistent with this
interpretation. But critics merely argue that facts and
intentions need not coincide, for the closed door policy is
really the intent of the government; the officials have simply
been unable to execute that intent. Psychology may also be
inconsistent with this interpretation. Not only may
humanitarianism and self-control go together, self-control can
be an integral element to a humanitarian. Rather than citing
my own studies of Ghandi, let me offer Blanche Cook's recent
7biography of Eleanor Roosevelt.2 Eleanor was terrified of
irrational behaviour which could not be managed and
controlled. She disciplined and cultivated her own power of
self-control just as she expanded the causes she championed
and the areas of her good works. The more assured she was in
her self-control, the more inexhaustible and effective she
became as a humanitarian .
Envision the state and its government as analogous to the
mind, our nationalist feelings as the sentiments and sometimes
passions of the heart that bind us together, the civil society
as the expression of our will, entrepreneurship and creativity
which resents being fettered by any outside authority, and the
welfare system as the caretaker of the body as a whole. The
state was viewed as maintaining control, ensuring the passions
of the heart served its purposes as it set boundaries and
limits which allowed the civil society to thrive as the state
ensured the body was taken care of and not exhausted by the
exertions of the collective will. Whether or not this was the
best or most apt vision of human psychology or the social
polity, it closely resembles the bourgeois ideal. The function
of the state was to hold nationalist passions and creative
entrepreneurial will in a coherent frame while preserving the
integrity and health of the body politic and the individuals
that were its parts. It is this coherence and congruency that
has begun to unravel.3
It is with this picture in mind that I want to discuss
four issues concerned with international action: the norms of
membership, early warning systems, humanitarian intervention
abroad and inhumanitarian intervention domestically.
Membership Norms
This first will be very easy. We are members of a number
8of societies and communities at one and the same time. At
least four are macro-societies as mentioned above. We are
citizens of states, members of ethnic groups, participants of
a welfare regime and members of civil societies.
In the latter we are the most atomic of individualists
according to most theoreticians. The libertarians would see
this membership in terms of our individual rights as the
necessary prerequisite to exercise our freedom to sell our
labour, hold property and conduct business. Membership in the
civil society is the primary if not almost the only membership
that really counts, for all other memberships are merely
instrumental devices to advance the individual as a member of
the civil society. In pure theory, these theoreticians
advocate a vision of pareto optimality, if there were only no
border controls, so that individuals could distribute
themselves around the world according to their own best
interests resulting, in some of their calculations, in a
doubling of world GDP.
Liberals also extol the primacy of membership in the
civil society, but material rights of labour exchange,
property ownership and entrepreneurship are but the
prerequisites which allow us to exercise our spiritual free
will. Humans are primarily holders of civil and political
rights, and a prosperous society is merely a condition for
advancing civil and political freedoms.
There have been critiques of atomistic theories. For
example, economists, such as Oded Stark at Harvard, who have
studied migration in terms of economic theory to test whether
in fact individuals move to maximize their incomes, have shown
how important the family is as a key factor in migration, how
important security for the family looms in the determination
of who moves and where. Further, the sociologists and
9economists have already taught us the importance of ethnic
factors - whether it is the old boys club or ethnic enclaves
in urban cities - in the economic success of the individual.
These economic factors are quite aside from the importance of
the psychological security and the importance of national
membership on rites of passage in birthing, emerging into
adolescence, in marriage and in death. Similarly, Charles
Taylor offers a communitarian critique4 of the Kantian picture
of ourselves as rational autonomous agents with a subjective
right where the individual is given the responsibility and
role in enforcing an immunity from outside interference to
ensure the respect due to them so that morality is seen
primarily as the product of an individual self-legislator
rather than a product of family socialization. Others have
seen the modern transformation of our moral premises as the
source of decay of any public morality.5
Individualists of either the liberal civil rights school
or the libertarian school would have us forget or reduce to
unimportance the ethnic and religious factors of membership.
Nationalists and fundamentalists, on the other hand, often
underestimate the civil rights and self interest factors or,
what is worse, project their communal ideals onto these areas,
as they pursue collective goals and willingly sacrifice
individual rights (and individuals) in that pursuit.
Theoreticians who took the civil society as basic and as
made up either of individuals in liberal theory, or,
alternatively, considered individuals only as members of
conflicting classes in the attempt to create a new communalism
to substitute for the old religions and recruit nationalism as
an affective force for their own collective goals, ignored or
tried to use nationalism for their own purposes. The
10
communists have demonstrably failed with their experiment. The
liberals are at the end of their tether and, like Trudeau,
they refuse to recognize their own illusions but, instead
denounce the "irrationality" of those who support the
importance and value and reality of other forms of membership
than simply membership in the civil society.
The only thing the liberals and libertarians agree on as
they fight over which types of membership is most important,
most fundamental, most natural, is that the state is an
artifact, a human creation based on a contract in which each
individual is given rights and the state is set up to protect
those rights at the same time as it protects its citizens. The
more serious of the theorists always recognized that these two
functions of the state were inherently at odds. In stressing
the rights of the citizen, politicians from Jefferson to
Eisenhower may rail at the dangers of standing armies. In
stressing the physical security of the individual as well as
their primacy as rational calculators of their own self
interests, theorists from Hobbes to Gauthier may laud the
importance of the state in providing security for the
individual. They all presumed a homogeneous nationality to
deal with affects as they stressed the importance of
"rational" and "man". They were unprepared and still are
unprepared for multiculturalism, overlapping memberships in
different national and religious communities and even multiple
citizenships.
And what happens when the state is entrusted not only
with our security from marauders, thieves, warring armies,
etc., but from the fates of genetics and disease, from the
disabilities of age and accident. What happens when our
welfare security and not just our physical security is
transferred from the family to the state at the very same time
when the state as an artifact to advance the civil society has
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become weaker and weaker?
I repeat these themes of my introduction simply to say
that world federalists, or others who would simply transfer
our concepts of individual membership to some form of a world
wide state in a utopian vision, have failed to address the
complexities and incongruities and paradoxes that have
developed in these overlapping types of membership.
The United Nations itself rests on a fundamentally
obsolete model - the strict sanctity of the sovereign state
and its primacy as an instrument and even building block of
collective security. So except when one large member state in
the name of the pure artificiality of the boundaries between
it and a neighbouring small state, commits blatant aggression,
the United Nations fumbles and stumbles as Yugoslavia
implodes, as Somalia reverts to anarchy and the instruments of
the state disintegrate altogether, as Afghanistan, having
thrown off the tyranny of economic collectivism, reverts to
the destructive militant rivalries of tribe and religion, as
even Germany, in the effort to throw off its Nazi heritage of
the most venomous and destructive of universal religious
scientisms - the belief in race - wedded to nationalism, finds
it difficult to cope as mobs attack refugees at the same time
as its efforts in partnership with France to create a new
supranational multinational state artifact through Maastricht
stumbles.
The fact is we are totally bereft of a new theory of
membership and its rights and how to coalesce these various
forms of membership on a world scale to ensure the peace and
security of humans while preserving the natural order. When
John Rawls published his twentieth century classic, A Theory
of Justice, in 1971, resurrecting classical political theory
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and insisting that principles of distributive justice were the
essence of political theory, who then recognized that his
model of distributive justice, applicable only to those who
already had membership in an existing liberal state, was but
the last and perhaps the most brilliant theoretical apologetic
of American liberalism just as it began to go into decline?
Early Warning
In the face of these fundamental challenges to both our
inherited theory and from the reality that confronts us daily,
how do we respond? I am part of a project working with UN
officials to construct an Early Warning System to allow the UN
to anticipate, prepare for and respond to mass migratory
movements produced by man-made disasters (notice the lack of
gender neutral language in this context; we do not say human-
made). We have constructed a model with information sharing
among humanitarian relief and UN agencies at the base,
supplemented by intelligence analysis and communication, with
all this material used as a foundation for fostering
cooperation and coordination amongst diverse humanitarian
agencies.
Thus, we install Jan Eliasson to foster cooperation among
the disparate UN and non-Un agencies set up to deal with these
disasters. But he is given the responsibility without the
shared information base, the analytic intelligence branch, or,
for that matter, the physical personnel. equipment and offices
to carry out such an enormous responsibility. Further, when
you recognize that the office is set up on the basis of a
doctrine of "good offices", of using its influence to bring
about cooperation among agencies dedicated to serving the same
ends but wedded to different cultures about means so that we
have created a humanitarian regime of what I once called
"bleeding hearts and bloody minds", when you recognize these
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and a host of other negative factors, one is inclined to throw
up one's hands in despair before one even begins.
When these humanitarian agencies are juxtaposed with
forces of violence amongst which they must work, the problem
becomes much more ominous. Humanitarian involvement in
situations of conflict where state and military controls are
still in place is one thing. But to undertake such efforts
where state control is exercised but its existence is denied
is another. Further, when there is no coherent "state"
authority to oppose these disruptive forces, humanitarian
cooperation appears as a chimera.
The fact is, if early warning systems are to be set up to
foster humanitarian coordination, there has to be a
coordinating power with a coherent will to make use of that
information. But we provide the early warning and coordinating
arm of the international agency with the paltriest budget. And
this in the face of one conflict, that of Yugoslavia, from
which there are already two million homeless. 300,000 refugees
are scattered throughout Europe, most in Germany but 40,000 in
Sweden. The property damage already totals over $60 billion
dollars. Two million people are homeless. 40% of Croatian
industrial capacity has already been destroyed. Thus, the
value of the property damage is but a fraction of the real
losses in terms of future wages and the production of material
goods. Even as we now face the threat of another 200,000
Bosnian refugees flooding into Western Europe, we still move
hestitangly and in piecemeal terms to handle a conflict that
is a threat to the peace and security of Europe quite aside
from the widespread suffering and the enormous numbers of
refugees produced.
Did we know the tragedy was coming? Could we have
prepared for it? Most certainly, yes. On the other hand, the
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conflict was not inevitable. It was not simply a product of
age old ethnic and religious rivalries merely held in check by
Tito authoritarianism. This was a conflict fostered by
political leaders intent on creating a state entity congruent
with state economies and a homogeneous nation to tie the state
together. In search of this ideal model of the congruent
nation-state controlling its own civil society, a war between
peoples over land was fostered by political leaders.
Not all writers who assume political office are liberals
like Vaclav Havel. Dobrica Cosic, the current President of
rump Yugoslavia, is a well-known Serbian novelist. He authored
the document of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science of
1986 which advocated restoration of Serbs to their rightful
place in the political galaxies denied all these years by
alleged victimization by foreign influences. In 1987,
Milosevic pledged to carry out this nationalist program.
Before the war with Slovenia, before the war with Croatia,
before the war with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia  instigated the
creation of a Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs in
the autonomous area of Kosovo, a territory within the Serbian
republic where 90% of the inhabitants were Albanians. Public
demonstrations were organized as a pretext and cover for the
militant take-over of institutions. Serbian colonists were
sent out to settle in Kosovo. The Serb language was made the
official language of the region. 6,000 Albanian-speaking
teachers were dismissed. The pattern of the use of irregular
militias to intimidate and drive out local majorities was
initiated as the Serbian minority set out on its path of
ethnic cleansing had begun.
The issue was not lack of information on what was
emerging, but lack of an intelligence tool to use that
information and the lack of a political body which could take
the information and analysis and translate it into policy
options for a body with the political muscle and will to carry
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those options out. The UN offers tokenism. The United States,
though assuming some leadership in the organization of the
belated but partially effective economic boycott, has largely
deferred a leadership role to the EEC. The EEC has been
divided between the faction led by Germany which has been much
more willing to condemn the Serbian aggression and
expansionist efforts as it engages in "ethnic cleansing", and
the Greeks who see the threat as coming from Muslims in Bosnia
allied with Turkey, or, even more ominously, with Iran, and
from Macedonia, perceived threats which have inclined the
Greeks to side with Serbia.
We - or most of us here I expect - are dedicated
humanitarians, putting our shoulders to the wheel regardless
of our weakened state and the forces arraigned against us. We
plough on. We work at creating, at the very least, an
information structure through which the core six or eight
international agencies engaged in emergency relief and refugee
work can pool data and analysis, not in order to create a
cooperative council - that would be far to ambitious - or even
to create the intelligence apparatus that might be helpful in
anticipating and planning responses to these human eruptions
of death and destruction - but simply to share information.
Yet the discussions occur every six months or so over years,
as if we had all the time to spare in the world. And then
everybody is too busy with the urgent crises at hand to come
to the meeting we had planned before, perhaps in recognition
that even this very modest attempt to create an Early Warning
System is but a quixotic effort, given the variety and
complexity of windmills against which we are tilting and the
enormous hurricane force winds driving their rotation.
Thus when we speak of going even beyond information
sharing and cooperation to develop institutional norms and
procedures for cooperative action, a visitor from an alien
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planet might believe we have lost all sense of reality given
what he or she sees around and would consider the meetings
planning an Early Warning System in the sanctuary of a
university merely musings of people who are truly mad, who
have chosen the sanctuary of the maddest of all places - a
university - to discuss their wild musings. One knows they are
truly wild because the issues are discussed and analyzed with
such detachment that, in the face of the death and destruction
around, an outside observer immediately knows that we are all
unhinged.
The inadequacies in the development of an Early Warning
System are but clues to the vast gap between espoused ideals
and the support available. There is an information and
coordination chasm to counter root causes of refugee flows
which truly threaten international peace, quite aside from the
total inability of the UN system to do anything about internal
mass violations of human rights within states. If the EEC does
so little with respect to a conflict from the Second World
right on its doorstep and which threatens its stability in the
South-east, what can the UN be expected to do in Somalia,
Sudan and Mozambique where death and slaughter are prevalent
and on the increase?
Humanitarian Intervention
Early warning is about information sharing, analysis,
thinking and planning. It is not about action. What about
action? What about the vision of collective security that was
at the heart of the vision of the UN? For a single historical
moment under the leadership of the United States for perhaps
its own self-interested motives, the world was galvanized into
collective military action to stop Saddam Hussein in his
tracks in spite of the denunciations of the those wary of the
use of military might, particularly under the leadership of
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the United States with its own record of imperial military
intervention, in spite of those unwilling to sacrifice lives
in defence of a monarchy which neither respected human rights
(though not the grossest of abusers of those rights) nor
assumed a mantle of a benevolent supporter of the poor and
impoverished, in spite of those who saw this assault as
another indignity heaped on the Arab world by western
interests in controlling the life supply of oil to the
industrialized countries, and from those in the west simply
chary of using military means in the aftermath of Vietnam when
economic sanctions might work given a longer time frame.
But this was not "humanitarian" intervention. This was
the classic protection of the fundamental principle of state
sovereign rights. The classic case of humanitarian
intervention emerged when the Kurds, fleeing the wrath of
Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of his defeat and withdrawal
from Kuwait, and their efforts to use that defeat to assert
their own autonomy and, perhaps, even independence, were
forced into mass flight. There was no intervention when they
were allowed to cross into Iran and the fundamentalist enemies
of the West offered them a sanctuary in full concurrence with
its obligations to refugees under UN agreements. There was
intervention when the Turks, contrary to their obligations,
prevented the entry of the fleeing Kurds, and then only when
international television showed the plight of hundreds dying
on the cold mountains as the world sat watching.
Whatever the mixture of motives, the action of Saddam
Hussein, even though it was not aggression against another
state but simply against a national group of its own citizens,
was declared a threat to peace and security of the region
justifying military intervention under the Charter to create
safe havens and protect the Kurds. The Turks were not
denounced for their breaches in their obligations to provide
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sanctuary to fleeing refugees as their self-interests in this
case were recognized as paramount. Was this a precedent for a
breach in the humanitarian accord? Was the humanitarian
intervention a breach in the power accord of the sanctity of
sovereign states, not in cases of need and widespread famine,
or even in cases of mass human rights violations by states
against their own citizens, but simply in cases where the
oppression by a state of its own citizens causes such a large
mass movement of peoples that the movement is not only a
humanitarian disaster for those who flee, but a threat to the
stability of the region? Perhaps only a modest gain, but a
gain nevertheless.
Well Yugoslavia proved otherwise. The blatant aggression
of the Serbs, futilely against the Slovenes, more effectively
against the Croats and most destructively against the
Bosnians, or, more precisely, the Muslim and Croatian
Bosnians, invited only economic sanctions and ritual
condemnations. A humanitarian intervention in such mountainous
terrain would require huge forces, would pose real risks at
loss of life as experienced mountain fighters, who had an
excellent record even against the huge Nazi war machine,
chewed up the humanitarian forces in a guerilla warfare.
Besides the political picture was far too confusing as Croats,
allies of the Bosnians, also appeared to be in cahoots with
the Serbs in dividing up Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further,
mercenary Muslims sent by Iran were reinforcing the Bosnian
Muslims. And was there perhaps some truth in the Bosnian Serb
fears that they would become an unprotected and victimized
minority in an independent state in which Muslims would be the
dominant minority?
Yugoslavia was a military, political, ethnic and
religious quagmire if not a mine field. This was quite aside
from the historical memories that identified different parts
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of the European community, initially asked to take the lead in
these eruptions in its own backyard, with different factions,
immobilizing the political will of the Europeans, or, more
accurately, delaying the exercise of that will while ensuring
that when it was exercised the efforts would be half-hearted.
Even humanitarian intervention to protect the delivery of
relief supplies was based on totally inadequate support. This
is also true in Somalia. The military forces committed to
humanitarian purposes are overstretched and undersupplied. And
the political will to do more seemed entirely absent.
Compassion fatigue now characterizes state policy. Though a
great deal of effort was made, it was totally inadequate. The
internal troubles of the United States, of Canada, of Europe
have taken centre stage as the human disasters grew.
Thus, though efforts are made to help, they come nowhere
near to meeting the even modest vision planted when three old
imperial powers led the international effort to assist and
protect the Kurds. Even modest grounds for humanitarian
intervention, based only on threats to international peace and
security rather than on massive human rights violations,
seemed to revert to a vision and a dream rather than becoming
institutionalized as an option in the arsenal of those
dedicated to protecting humans from being victimized.
What however could one expect when it was so difficult to
organize the world to even deliver charity - food and clothing
- let alone to organize to provide the police and military
forces to protect ethnic minorities in a conflictual world.
The fact is the world could not even agree on what
humanitarian intervention was, what arrangements were
appropriate between UN and state auspices, what rationale
could justify such intervention, particularly in light of the
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fact that in most cases the extent of casualties, the costs,
the demands all over the world, etc., would make humanitarian
intervention an unrealistic option. Further, the principle of
the sanctity of the sovereign state, the foundation stone of
the UN, was at odds with a concern for individuals and masses
in distress.
Mass Movements other than Convention Refugees
But only a very small portion of the large numbers on the
move are Convention refugees. And even for these and their
kissing cousins, those fleeing different ideological, ethnic
and tribal factions in a civil war, the mechanisms of the
international community are overstretched far beyond any
realistic capacity to respond to all the crises.
One of the problems of this overextension of obligations
is that there are a myriad of other types of mass movements
beyond those of refugees who legally do not fall under UN and
UNHCR protection. And I am ignoring for the moment the
internally displaced fleeing internal strife and conflict who
number almost twice the seventeen million refugees around the
world. And I am ignoring the tremendously larger numbers who
flee rural poverty to occupy shanty towns on the periphery of
the megalopolises that were once habitable cities.
We lack a convention to protect those who cross
international borders fleeing civil war. We lack a convention
to protect the rights of labourers migrating from one country
to another, but who can be kicked out at will with few
21
protections as we saw both when Saddam Hussein conquered
Kuwait and the Egyptians, Bangladeshis, Filipinos, etc. fled,
and then, when the monarchy was restored with the defeat of
Hussein, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian workers, who had
lived in Kuwait for decades, were expelled even though only a
minority had actively sided with the Iraqis. We cannot even
protect women servicing the flesh trade in the guise of
entertainers who work in Japan, or the nannies who are
exploited in Hong Kong.
The world humanitarian system is overstretched, asked to
do more all the time with less resources to do it. But most
importantly, there is the absence of a coherent structure to
take responsibility for each crisis.
The Need for Multilateral Harmonization
In the face of a total vacuum in any intellectual
coherence depicting rights and obligations of the individuals
rather than the states who belong to this human world, in the
absence of agreed upon international norms, with an early
warning system in the foetal stages of development, in light
of the gross inadequacies of international protective regimes
let alone the mechanisms able to protect the lives of the mass
numbers of people on the move for the widest variety of
reasons, the western states though a number of vehicles  -
Schengen, Dublin, the informal consultations - have been
exploring means of cooperating to respond to these pressures
and irregular movements.
These states could make the effort to create regional
regimes to guarantee protection and expand and enhance the
international legal regime already in place. They could
enhance in their own constitutions and domestic laws the
protections needed for the wide variety of peoples on the
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move. In other words they could, at the very least, develop a
coherent regional legal structure for dealing with irregular
movements of migrants. Instead, Europe in particular has not
even faced up to the fact that its member countries are
immigration countries.
Even within the very narrow area of Convention refugees
where we have seen the greatest developments in international
and case law, the decision making authority varies from state
to state, from bureaucratic authorities in some countries
raised on a culture that their job was to keep out uninvited
guests to relatively independent quasi judicial authorities in
other jurisdictions. The procedural protections are widely
varied as well. In some jurisdictions, the hearings are
strictly private, quite aside from the wishes of a claimant.
In some, the claimant has no right to an oral hearing, in
others, no right to counsel. In Canada, the benefit of doubt
is given to evidence provided by the claimant while in other
jurisdictions the relative balance may only be in favour of
the claimant. Or the claimant may be required to truly prove
that he or she is a convention refugee, in which case the
balance shifts in favour of the state in resisting such
claims.
Then when the Canadian system is compared to these other
jurisdictions, journalists or other observers interpret the
more generous rates of acceptance of the Canadian system to
the fact that we are patsies subject to organized smuggling
rings playing on Canadian naiveté.
Where strides have been made in harmonization, they have
been made in interdiction. Or division of responsibilities
have substituted for harmonization schemes. Or when
harmonization is utilized, it is as a rhetorical tool to
divide up responsibilities in spite of the inherent force at
work in such a strategy of moving standards of protection
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downwards to the lowest common denominator.
If the West cannot even get its act together to harmonize
its procedures in the narrow area of providing protection for
Convention refugees, not only to minimize abusive claims or to
prevent asylum shopping, but to create a fair and efficacious
mechanism to protect Convention refugees while dividing the
burden of successful claimants among the member states
according to an equitable formula, then how can they be
expected to provide leadership in creating a coherent
international regime to cover the wide gamut of involuntary
movements. Instead the Western states expend most of their
efforts in cooperating to develop deterrence strategies which
are openly aimed at shifting the burden of protecting refugees
from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, paradoxically, they
cooperate in the area where their interests least coincide.
This is quite aside from the fact that harmonization of
proceedings could provide considerable savings from the 6-7
billion dollar cost of western refugee determination systems,
savings which could go a long way to benefit international
refugees who now receive but a small fraction of such funds in
spite of their considerably larger numbers.
Conclusion
I am not here to play the role of Cassandra. But if we
are to attempt to pool our efforts to understand and deal with
the movement of peoples, and the wide range of such movements,
then we would do well to understand the forces at work
undermining such efforts, the lack of critical self-
consciousness which encourages us to follow old paths when
they mere are stopgap measures, the limited tools available
and the incongruence of the various mechanisms available. We
live in an age of enormous challenges, but an age where we
face these hurricane challenges with the tools of primitive
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farmers. Thus while we act out of hope I believe we should all
attempt to see with the vision and insights of the blind
Theseus.
Thus, although the agenda for the nineties has been set
forth from the negative basis of a critical look at the
present, it does contain an agenda of thought and action for
the nineties. And I have presented it in order of lexical
priority that I believe are the major issues in the refugee
field for the nineties. They are not the only issues to say
the least. I am not even sure they are the most urgent, since
issues such as the relationship of refugees and gender are
important topics for both research and action. Nevertheless,
they are among the most important issues and I believe that I
have ordered them in what I think is their importance.
The first issue dealing with normative theory may seem
esoteric. But without a coherent intellectual and normative
road map that reconciles principles of distributive justice
with membership theory we are lost without a compass. Early
warning may appear as either a pipe dream or an unnecessary
extravagance, since the problem does not seem to be the
timeliness of warnings but the ability to mobilize an
appropriate response. But unless we have the information and
the analytic tools and mechanisms to face the crises, let
alone the institutions of cooperation necessary to deal with
them, then we will simply be faced year after year with
another situation of mass starvation and distress where our
publics decry the inadequate preparation and lack of political
will of our international bodies as they clamour for the
instantaneous responses demanded from their pricked
consciences to situations that many of us have known were
building towards a crises for months.
Humanitarian intervention may be read as a euphemism for
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militarism in the guise of humanitarianism only to be applied
when it is based on self interest and where sustained and
forceful militant resistance is unlikely. But it a doctrine
which we must clarify and prepare for, set forth both the
theoretical normative and descriptive grounds and the
institutional and mechanical tools to put it into place. With
respect to involuntary movements of peoples, some efforts are
going into the efforts to broaden the protections afforded
convention refugees to other groups, such as those who flee
civil strife. Efforts are being made to create protection
regimes for groups such as international labour migrants.
Others want to create separate regimes for each of the
different groups of migrants. But this must be done
systematically, coherently and comprehensively. The piecemeal
and patchwork approach of the past demands replacement by a
broader more encompassing vision.
There are at least two traditions for responding to the
force and urgency of the imminent dangers that surround us as
we face the emergence of a new world disorder which I depicted
at the beginning of this paper. They can be found in the
intellectual foundations of the West. One is to pull up the
drawbridge and retreat to the safety of the familiar. In
intellectual discourse, this pattern was set by Theognis, the
gnomic poet of the sixth century BC who tried to codify the
aristocratic educational traditions of classical Greek life,
and like Pindar, the lyricist for Thebes, to rally his fellow
Megarians in his Sayings to Cyrnus to resist the new Ionian
proclamation and discovery that we all belonged to a singular
world-order. Like most of his fellow poets, akin to Eliot and
Pound in this century, rather than playing the role of
legislators for mankind, these poets were obstreperous
reactionaries revolted with the social and intellectual
revolution that assaulted them from all sides.
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Inspired by pride in the merits and accomplishments of
their own mainland tribal cultures in opposition to the
universalist naturalism of the Ionian thinkers that threatened
to wash ashore from the islands of free thought in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the espousal of a universal order determined
by nature, Theognis set forth to teach male bonding rooted in
the wedding of the material and spiritual, in the Greek case,
the nobility of the perfect body disciplined by a harmonious
soul. A system of morality was espoused to enhance the
familiar and resist the strange, to blame the problems of the
new economic disorder and fractures threading through the
social structure on the masses and the mixture of aliens among
them, arguing that the lack of social cohesion would lead to
conflict and disorder. For example, in the second poem of the
book, Theognis declares the physical structure of the city is
the same, but the people there, and those striving for and
achieving authority roles, are now different. Lacking
traditions (that is, his traditions) they lack standards and
they lie and cheat to achieve their place in the polis. The
strangers are portrayed as lying, deceiving and treacherous.
But the central issue of the poem is justice. And justice
depends on personal trust. Personal trust can only be built up
by people who know one another and share common values. Change
produces a crisis of confidence and credit, not just in the
monetary sense. Justice depends on well-tested loyalties. And
justice is defined not in distributive but in protective
terms.
This is a doctrine that had been espoused in vulgar form
by McArthyites and, most currently, by the neo-fascists of
East Germany. But it has its more aristocratic apologists
where adherence to the familiar becomes a code word for
exclusiveness, where assimilation of the stranger is seen as
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the incorporation of an alien body. And the issue is not
divorced from economic well-being. For Theognis is clear that
the decline in wealth of his people is related to the
incorporation of strangers into authoritative membership in
the polity.
There is another Western tradition. It is associated with
a universalism that disparages the particular as backward, as
insular, as economically debilitating. It is a message that
reaches towards a universal order of membership. It is a
tradition that goes back to the myth of the tower of Babylon,
the building of a polis in which we all can be equal citizens.
Unfortunately, this "scientific" model for mankind is as
unworkable as the insular model of communitarianism is
reactionary.
Thus, the only viable enterprise is one which attempts to
build a coherent rather than a universal order, one that
builds on and respects differences rather than one which
directly or indirectly homogenizes differences. That is why we
must build the new order creatively and not defensively, and
build it on the positive traditions which celebrate the values
of difference while lauding mutual respect and recognition.
That is why a UN built on an image of an abstract world order
of universal rights of individuals and the sanctity of
sovereign states is inadequate as the powerful forces of
nationalism demand their place in the sun. May all of us,
whether brown, black or pink, wear the same protective gel as
we enjoy the warmth of the rays of the same sun while we also
protect ourselves against the cancer of its ultra violet rays.
==============================================================
=====
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